ORIGINAL PAPER
Capacity remuneration mechanisms: classification and experiences
1
Mineral and Energy Economy Research Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
Submission date: 2021-02-18
Final revision date: 2021-03-09
Acceptance date: 2021-03-10
Publication date: 2021-03-24
Corresponding author
Aleksandra Komorowska
Mineral and Energy Economy Research Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Wybickiego 7A, 31-261, Kraków, Poland
Mineral and Energy Economy Research Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Wybickiego 7A, 31-261, Kraków, Poland
Polityka Energetyczna – Energy Policy Journal 2021;24(1):101-114
KEYWORDS
TOPICS
ABSTRACT
Capacity remuneration mechanisms have been imposed globally in order to ensure capacity adequacy and prevent a sharp increase in electricity prices in the long-term. The main causes of their introduction are to provide financial support for companies to generate electricity or reduce consumption in peak demand and ensure sufficient incentives for potential investors. The paper aims to review the capacity remuneration mechanisms introduced in various countries. The follow-
ing mechanisms are discussed: capacity payment, strategic reserve, reliability options, capacity obligations, and capacity auctions. The paper indicates the main advantages of mechanisms and key challenges related to their introduction and operation as well. The paper contributes to the existing literature by extending and updating the knowledge on the capacity remuneration mechanisms in various energy markets. The results indicate that the most complex schemes are market mechanisms. Regardless of the nature of the traded good (call options, certificates, capacity obligation), the second market structure must be introduced and managed. Consequently, the obligations are imposed on (i) the regulatory body (regulator or transmission system operator), generation companies (or demand-side response), trading companies, and consumers. The other challenge of the implementation of various CRMs is related to the transparent treatment of all technologies. All CRMs should be technologically neutral, but ultimately, some units are more favorable due to their greater impact on the reliability of the power system.
METADATA IN OTHER LANGUAGES:
Polish
Mechanizmy wynagradzania zdolności wytwórczych: klasyfikacja i doświadczenia
rynek mocy, mechanizmy wynagradzania zdolności wytwórczych, aukcje mocy, rezerwa strategiczna, opcje na niezawodność
Mechanizmy wynagradzania zdolności wytwórczych zostały wprowadzone na całym świecie w celu zapewnienia wystarczalności mocy wytwórczych i mitygacji ryzyka związanego z gwałtownym wzrostem cen energii elektrycznej w perspektywie długoterminowej. Głównymi przyczynami ich wprowadzenia jest zapewnienie wsparcia finansowego przedsiębiorstwom wytwórczym oraz jednostkom redukcji zapotrzebowania w szczytowym zapotrzebowaniu na moc oraz zapewnienie wystarczających zachęt dla potencjalnych inwestorów. Artykuł ma na celu przegląd mechanizmów wynagradzania mocy wytwórczych wprowadzonych w różnych krajach. Omówiono następujące mechanizmy: płatność za moc, rezerwę strategiczną, opcje na niezawodność, zobowiązania mocowe oraz aukcje mocy. W artykule wskazano główne zalety tych mechanizmów oraz kluczowe wyzwania związane z ich wdrażaniem i funkcjonowaniem. Artykuł wnosi wkład do istniejącej literatury poprzez poszerzenie i aktualizację wiedzy na temat mechanizmów wynagradzania mocy na różnych rynkach energii. Wyniki wskazują, że najbardziej złożonymi systemami są mechanizmy rynkowe. Niezależnie od charakteru towaru będącego przedmiotem obrotu (opcje, certyfikaty, obowiązek mocowy), konieczne jest wprowadzenie i zarządzanie drugim rynkiem. W konsekwencji, nakładane są nowe obowiązki na regulatora, operatora systemu przesyłowego, przedsiębiorstwa wytwórcze (lub jednostki redukcji zapotrzebowania), przedsiębiorstwa obrotu i konsumentów. Kolejne wyzwanie stanowi transparentne i sprawiedliwe traktowanie wszystkich technologii. Teoretycznie wszystkich mechanizmy powinny być neutralne technologicznie, jednak ostatecznie niektóre jednostki są bardziej faworyzowane ze względu na ich większy wpływ na niezawodność systemu elektroenergetycznego.
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